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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the research question of whether positional preferences give rise
to intertemporal economic distortions. It also characterizes a corrective tax policy
in cases where such distortions arise.
As positional preferences imply that people impose externalities on one another,
one might argue that this type of preferences do give rise to distortions and therefore
calls for corrective taxation. In this study, we show that the research question
is not that easily answered. At least four characteristics are important in this
context. First, are individuals positional with respect to consumption or wealth, or
both? Second, are wealth or consumption reference levels, with which individuals
compare their own consumption and wealth, respectively, determined solely within
the home country or also partly abroad? Third, do governments use a welfarist
objective or some paternalist objective for determining which kind of distortions
(if any) are observed and how to correct for them? Fourth, do governments of
different jurisdictions coordinate their policies? The paper develops an endogenous
growth model to examine the conditions under which positional consumption and/or
wealth concerns lead to intertemporal distortions from the perspective of national
governments, as well as the conditions under which the choices made by Nash-
competing national governments lead to a globally optimal resource allocation.
Positional preferences, manifested through (status-driven) social comparisons,
have played an important role in recent research on optimal taxation and public
expenditure (e.g., Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Wendner and Goulder,
2008; Eckerstorfer and Wendner, 2013; Kanbur and Tuomala, 2013; Ghosh and
Wendner, 2018). Consumption positionality is, in this literature, meant to im-
ply that individuals not only derive utility from their own absolute consumption
(broadly defined), as in standard economic models; they also derive utility from
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their own consumption relative to that of referent others.1,2 A typical result in
this literature is that positional concerns motivate a significant corrective element
in the tax system, due to the externality that the underlying social comparisons
give rise to, which tends to imply much higher marginal income tax rates, or much
higher taxation of certain commodities, compared to models without any social
comparisons among individuals/households.
Yet, very few studies have tried to systematically characterize the conditions
under which positional preferences are distortive (such that policy intervention is
really called for), and when they are not. The main purpose of the present paper is
to fill this gap by deriving necessary and sufficient conditions under which positional
preferences distort the intertemporal consumption choice. For deriving those con-
ditions, we take a broad perspective by considering: (i) positionality with respect
to consumption as well as wealth; (ii) consumption-/wealth reference levels that are
partially determined by foreign countries; (iii) welfarist or paternalist governments;
and (iv) a case with international policy cooperation. Our approach is described in
greater detail below.
Contrary to most previous studies, which concentrate on how positional concerns
affect the atemporal consumption-leisure choice and the policy implications thereof
(e.g., Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008, 2018; or Aronsson et al., 2018), we
consider an endogenous growth model where individuals can be positional both in
terms of their consumption and wealth.3 In this setting, we derive the conditions
1The standard reference for status-driven, conspicuous consumption is Veblen (1899), even if
the recognition of such concerns is of much older date (see the literature review in Section 2). See
also Duesenberry’s (1949) theory of relative income and Hirsch (1977) for a definition of “positional
goods”.
2That positional preferences is a well-researched topic is evident from the fact that a quick
search in Google Scholar with the phrase, ”keeping up with the Joneses”, brings forth about
10,000 (working) papers. To trace the reason for that, we can consider a specific example. For
quite some time, the SUV sector has been the fastest growing segment of the auto industry in
major regions (see e.g., Euromonitor International 2016). Referring to this development, which
is clearly indicative of the positionality of preferences, Abel (2005) makes the following comment:
‘Conventional economic theory assumes that the utility of a person ... is independent of the
consumption of others. Yet a visit to the parking lot of a suburban shopping mall may tempt an
economist to question this independence.”
3A related model was used by Ghosh and Wendner (2018) to analyze optimal income and
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under which these relative concerns cause distortions, whereby the decentralized
outcome diverges from the social optimum.
A central aspect of our analysis is the distinction between two types of social
objectives: a welfarist objective and a paternalist objective. The welfarist objec-
tive represents the conventional approach and means that the government (or social
planner)4 respects all aspects of consumer preferences and forms the social objective
thereupon. Consequently, a welfarist government seeks to internalize the external-
ities that relative consumption and wealth concerns give rise to. In contrast, the
paternalist objective implies that the government does not respect the individual
preferences for relative consumption and relative wealth, although it respects all
other aspects of consumer preferences. As such, this government ”launders” the
individual preferences when forming the social objective. The intuition is that a
paternalist government would like the individuals/households to behave as if these
concerns were absent and will design the public policy accordingly. Although wel-
farism is the common approach to normative economics, it is not uncontroversial
when individuals engage in social comparisons. This is because concerns for rela-
tive consumption and relative wealth can be interpreted as expressions of envy; an
anti-social preference that several authors have argued against including in a social
welfare function (e.g., Sen, 1979; Harsanyi 1982; Goodin, 1986). This suggests to
us that a broad perspective is useful when characterizing the distortive effects of
social comparisons.5
Another central aspect is that relative concerns may partly emanate from social
consumption taxes; yet, without any reference to multi-country economies or paternalism, which
are core issues here (see below).
4Although conceptually different in principle, we will use the terms ”government” and ”social
planner” interchangeably in what follows.
5In reality, it is not easy to identify governments of specific countries as being one of these two
types. However, the philosophy of Nordic countries is generally to assign greater importance to the
public sector under the notion that consumers may face difficulties in making informed decisions,
and the requisite information can sometimes be acquired better by public agencies, which could
thereby be viewed as paternalist in nature. Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP was
more than 50% in these countries compared to less than 35% for the US in 2005. Of this, welfare
spending was above 35% for these countries compared to about 20% for the US: see The Nordic
Model (2007, ch. 8, Table 8.1).
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comparisons with people in other countries. Indeed, recent empirical evidence sug-
gests that the importance of inter-country comparisons has increased over time (e.g.,
Clark and Senik, 2011; Becchetti et al., 2013). To incorporate such comparisons
in the analysis, we follow the methodological approach outlined by Aronsson and
Johansson-Stenman (2015). In our setting, this means decomposing the measures
of reference consumption and reference wealth - the variables by which each indi-
vidual compares his/her own consumption and wealth, respectively - in two parts:
one originating from within-country comparisons and the other from comparisons
with people in other countries (e.g., as transmitted by social media, internet, and
television on a daily basis).6 Although the reference measures are exogenous to any
individual (who is assumed to act as an atomistic agent), the domestic part of these
measures are endogenous to a national government while the foreign part is exoge-
nous. Note that cross-country comparisons have implications for the distortions
that positional concerns give rise to. Under welfarism, cross-country comparisons
would imply that a national government (whose objective is a national social welfare
function) fails to implement the global social optimum, due to that the international
externalities would still remain un-internalized in such a setting, whereas the policy
responses by national governments may coincide with the responses by a (hypo-
thetical) global social planner under paternalism. The reason is that paternalist
governments strive at correcting a (perceived) behavioral failure; not internalizing
the externalities that the underlying social comparisons give rise to.
To summarize, the contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we use a more
general framework for characterizing the intertemporal distortions caused by po-
sitional concerns than earlier studies, which turn out to be special cases of our
model. Prior studies on social comparisons in dynamic economies typically look at
either consumption positionality or wealth positionality. We demonstrate that the
6That foreign consumption/wealth is important in our story is reflected in the purchase of
luxury goods in foreign markets (31% of total) or at airports (16% of total) by consumers of
such goods. These proportions rise to 40% and 20% respectively when consumers from emerging
markets are considered, who typically do not have access to the same range of products or brands
that are available in more mature markets: see Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2017, page 5.
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wealth and consumption positionalities interact in non-trivial ways. This is true
also in Nakamoto (2009) who, like us, considers a preference for wealth in addition
to consumption positionality. However, his result that consumption positionality
always introduces a distortion is a special case that does not generally hold once
households are positional with respect to wealth as well. Specifically, once con-
sumption positionality matches wealth positionality, positional preferences do not
cause an intertemporal distortion. Second, we analyze the distortions emanating
from positional concerns and the policy implications thereof from the perspectives
of welfarist and paternalist governments. Compared to previous research, which
emphasizes that the optimal tax policy responses are often surprisingly similar un-
der the two welfare criteria, despite that the motive for corrective taxation differs
between them in a fundamental way (Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2018), we
demonstrate that distortions and optimal policy responses can be quite different
when international externalities are involved.
Our main results are summarized as follows. First, we demonstrate that the
existence of a balanced growth path does not imply efficiency. This means that
a balanced growth path may exist in spite of intertemporally distortive positional
preferences. Second, with a preference for - but without positionality in - wealth,
consumption positionality is always distortionary.7 Also, the distortion is greater
with a paternalist than with a welfarist objective. This is because the welfarist
government attaches value to increased relative consumption (due to that it treats
the foreign reference measure as exogenous), while the paternalist government, in
its social welfare function, does not attach any social value to increased relative con-
sumption; consequently, the saving rate and growth rate are higher for the paternal-
ist government. Third, we show that consumption positionality is not necessarily
distortive in the presence of wealth-dependent preferences, as argued above.
Fourth, the endogenous-exogenous composition of the reference levels, as per-
7Here households, by not taking into account the wealth externality, save less than either type
of government would, and consequently the growth rate for the decentralized economy is lower
than under a planner.
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ceived by national policy makers, impacts on the nature of distortions implied by
positional preferences. Thus, positional preferences may give rise to one distor-
tion (like over-saving) according to a welfarist government, while giving rise to the
opposite kind of distortion (under-saving) according to a paternalist government.
This is a rather interesting case where the apparently puzzling result is consistent
from an economic standpoint, but where a judgement on which policy is optimal
has ultimately to be dictated by philosophical considerations. To the best of our
knowledge, this type of issue has not been systematically investigated before.
Fifth, we characterize, under both types of government, the optimal income
tax/subsidy implications in terms of the gap between the private and social marginal
rates of substitution between wealth and consumption.
Finally, by considering the domestic and foreign economies simultaneously, and
if the positional preferences are distortive, we show that Nash-competing national
governments may have incentives to implement a global social optimum if based on
paternalist objectives, while the global social optimum typically differs from Nash
equilibrium under welfarist objectives.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on
positional preferences, highlighting issues of particular importance for the present
study. Section 3 presents the endogenous growth model for both the market econ-
omy and the social decision-problems. Section 4 derives conditions for non-distortionarity
of positional preferences in a “one-country” context by comparing the outcome of
the uncontrolled market economy with the resource allocation implemented by a
welfarist and a paternalist government, respectively, as well as examines the op-
timal tax policy implications following from these distortions. Section 5 extends
the analysis to a global economy, where a globally optimal (welfarist and paternal-
ist) resource allocation is compared with a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium from
the perspective of the distortions caused by international consumption and wealth
comparisons. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 A Brief Literature Review
The importance of positionality in human behavior was recognized in the early
literature.8 Following Smith (1759), Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), and other
eminent economists, there also exists a large volume of current literature on this
issue. In more recent times, Easterlin (1995) demonstrated that while national
incomes have increased over the decades, happiness levels have not grown.9 One
explanation for this Easterlin Paradox is that people have positional preferences,
as emphasized by Clark et al. (2008). The recent literature provides abundant
significant empirical evidence for positionality in consumer preferences (e.g., Solnick
and Hemenway, 1998, 2005; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Johansson-Stenman
and Martinsson, 2006). Furthermore, clearly visible goods such as housing - which
often represents a significant part of the households’ wealth - are more positional
than other, less visible goods (Alpizar et al., 2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005;
Carlsson et al., 2007). A recent brief discussion is provided in Wendner (2014).
As explained in the introduction, an important element of our paper is that in
evaluating the distortionary effects of relative concerns, we consider a paternalist
government in addition to a welfarist one. This is because several authors, including
Sen (1979) and Harsanyi (1982), argue that it is questionable to include “anti-social”
preferences, such as envy, in a social welfare function.10 Their arguments call for a
8That social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behaviour was pointed
out by Darwin (1871), who emphasized sexual selection besides natural selection (on this, see
Truyts (2010)). In his The Republic (Book II), Plato argues: Since ... appearance tyrannizes over
truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. This passage astoundingly
resembles Darwin’s argument on sexual selection.
9This is striking because a well-established empirical finding is that in a given society the
rich are happier than the poor: see Clark and Senik (2011). There is both single-country and
international evidence showing that the rich are happier than the poor within a given country,
that those in richer countries have higher happiness and life satisfaction scores than those in poorer
countries (see, e.g., Blanchflower (2008)), and that an increase in individual income over time is
associated with increasing happiness.
10The following quote from Harsanyi nicely sums up this viewpoint: “It is, of course, well
known that a person’s preferences may be distorted by factual errors, ignorance, careless thinking,
rash judgments, or strong emotions hindering rational choice, etc. Therefore, we may distinguish
between a person’s explicit preferences, i.e., his preferences as they actually are, possibly distorted
by factual and logical errors – and his true’ preferences, i.e., his preferences as they would be
under ‘ideal conditions’ and, in particular, after careful reflection and in possession of all relevant
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paternalist welfare function that does not attach any social value to increased indi-
vidual utility caused by higher relative consumption and/or relative wealth. Other
authors are more positive as regards the inclusion of positional preferences in a wel-
fare function (Piketty and Saez, 2013, p. 453). Frank (2005) argues that positional
concerns, rather than reflecting anti-social preferences, might reflect instrumental
reasons such as the need for families to keep up with community spending to be
able to live in areas where their children could attend good quality schools. How-
ever, irrespective of which perspective one takes, a relevant question is whether
positional concerns distort the resource allocation and, in that case, what the op-
timal policy responses look like. It is interesting to note that the policy rules for
optimal marginal income taxation may be quite similar, despite that the welfarist
and paternalist governments have different motives for using corrective taxation,
as in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018). Furthermore, in their numerical
analysis, they also find that the levels of marginal and average taxation as well as
the overall redistribution policy are often quite similar. We extend their analysis
to a dynamic model with wealth accumulation, where individuals/households are
positional both in terms of their consumption and wealth, and by allowing for social
comparisons between (as well as within) countries.11
Despite that the policy oriented literature on social comparisons has typically fo-
cused on one-country economies, inter-country comparisons have most likely gained
importance in recent decades. James (1987) contends that the direction of change
in tastes from non-positional to positional consumption has historically to do with
information. In order to exclude the influence of irrational preferences, all we have to do is to
define social utility in terms of the various individuals’ ‘true’ preferences, rather than in terms of
their explicit preferences.” (Harsanyi (1977), p. 29-30). Harsanyi goes further, suggesting that one
needs “to disregard, not only preferences distorted by factual or logical errors, but also preferences
based on clearly antisocial attitudes, such as sadism, resentment, or malice” (Harsanyi (1977), p.
30). In the same vein, Goodin observes that private preferences are suitable for a government
objective function only if they are laundered (Goodin (1986)).
11Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018), Kanbur and Tuomala (2013), and Micheletto (2011)
investigate optimal nonlinear redistributive taxation in the presence of positional preferences in the
context of a paternalist welfare criterion, while Dodds (2012) considers linear income taxation. All
of these papers are very much in the spirit of the optimal income tax tradition with heterogeneous
households. However, none of these papers considers either a dynamic setting, or a preference for
wealth, or partially exogenous reference levels as we do.
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the dependence of developing countries on goods produced in advanced economies.
Such goods have come to acquire an increasingly large proportion of “high-income”
characteristics over time, including sophisticated packaging, advertising, and brand
differentiation that may be described as highly visible (Stewart, 1977).
Becchetti et al. (2013) start from the premise that (i) individuals conventionally
tend to compare the quality of life of their own country with that of other countries,
and (ii) globalization and the development of transportation and telecommunication
technologies (internet, social networks, etc.) have dramatically increased the fre-
quency of comparisons of standard of living among different countries.12 Based on
these considerations, they conduct an econometric analysis using the Eurobarome-
ter survey, showing that life satisfaction has been increasingly negatively affected by
the distance between the average national gross disposable income in the individ-
ual’s own country and that of the richest country in a given geographical area.13 Tax
policy implications of social comparisons between countries have been addressed by
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2015). Their contribution is to compare the op-
timal labor income tax policy implicit in a non-cooperative (Nash and Stackelberg)
equilibrium with the corresponding policy implicit in a cooperative equilibrium,
based on welfarist objectives.
Turning to research on tax policy and relative consumption in dynamic economies,
there are only a few earlier studies available (since the bulk of literature on policy re-
sponses to positional concerns is based on static models); all of them are based on the
12Clearly, preferences are more likely to be positional once individuals have access to the media
and the internet, which makes it possible for them to draw comparisons with their peers. This is
especially true when it comes to evaluating one’s status in relation to foreign country residents.
In relation to this, Clark and Senik (2010) appeal to a number of questions that appear in the
European Social Survey and find that those with no internet access (23% of the sample) attach less
importance to income comparisons. Those who spend more than one hour per weekday watching
TV (72% of the sample) compare more in general, especially to “others”, and city-dwellers (60%
of the sample) compare more, especially to “friends”.
13The authors consider that countries, and not just groups of peers, may be reference groups.
When doing so, they control for various types of standard reference group effects. Their findings
provide additional insights on the Easterlin paradox. In fact, under the extreme case in which
only relative and not absolute income matters, an equiproportional increase in individual economic
wellbeing leaves individual life satisfaction unaffected. Their results imply that life satisfaction
may even fall if this event is paralleled by a higher increase in per capita income of peer countries.
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welfarist approach to optimal taxation, and none of them considers the possibility
that individuals/households are positional in terms of their wealth. Ljunqvist and
Uhlig (2000) analyze optimal labor income taxation in a dynamic representative-
agent model and assume that a catching-up-with-the-Joneses motive characterizes
the consumer preference for relative consumption. Their work was later extended
by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010, 2014), who examine optimal nonlinear
taxation of labor income and capital income in overlapping-generations economies
with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information; the former study focuses
on the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses motive for relative consumption, while the lat-
ter addresses the keeping-up and catching-up motives simultaneously. One result
of bearing for the analysis carried out below is that, if the income tax is optimal,
and if the degree of consumption positionality is constant over time, capital income
taxes will play no role in the correction for positional consumption externalities.
The important research objective of the present paper is to study the distortive
effects of positional preferences, as highlighted in the introduction. Few other papers
address this issue as we do. Alonso-Carrera et al. (2006) consider an Ak model (like
us) in which habit-forming households exhibit positional preferences for consump-
tion, and examine the interaction between relative consumption and habits. The
present paper analyzes the simultaneous implications of positional preferences for
consumption and wealth, with exogenous labor supply.14 A study more closely re-
lated to ours is Ghosh and Wendner (2018), which examines a functionally specified
framework with wealth-dependent preferences. Theirs, like ours, is an endogenous
growth model with wealth externalities15, but they do not consider the general
framework analyzed here. Our study differs from Ghosh and Wendner (2018) in
four important ways. (i) Their paper does not focus on the distortionary nature of
14Without wealth-dependent preferences, earlier studies (for instance, Fisher and Hof (2000),
Liu and Turnovsky (2005)) argue that positional preferences have no impact on the steady state
equilibrium (and, therefore, do not have a distortionary effect) once labor supply is exogenous.
If, additionally, utility is wealth-dependent, as in our paper, then distortionarity is possibly intro-
duced.
15The framework of Nakamoto (2009) is similar to Ghosh and Wendner (2018), but he, however,
considers a neoclassical growth model and does not have wealth externalities in his set-up.
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positional preferences and does not deal with non-optimal economic growth rates.
The present paper explicates these issues. (ii) While their study considers a social
planner’s welfare function, the present paper goes further by examining both wel-
farist and paternalist welfare functions, as discussed above. (iii) In their paper, all
social comparisons are local in nature, such that the reference levels for consumption
and wealth are exclusively determined by the home economy. Our study allows for
consumption and wealth comparisons with other countries (the rest of the world).
(iv) Finally, their paper considers utility functions in explicit form, whereas our
study develops an analysis for fully general utility functions.
In the next section, we develop the model and derive the optimality conditions
for both a welfarist and a paternalist government.
3 The Model
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model of a closed economy that al-
lows for fully endogenous growth. Endogenous growth stems from constant returns
to capital (Ak model). Time is considered to be continuous. There is a large
number of households and firms, the respective number of which we normalize to
unity. Households are homogeneous and exhibit positional preferences. They de-
rive utility not only from own consumption and own wealth (as in Weber (1930),
Pigou (1941), Markowitz (1952), Kurz (1968), Zou (1994; 1995), Kaplow (2009),
Nakamoto (2009), Kumhof et al. (2015), and Rehme (2017), among others), but
also from own consumption relative to some consumption reference level and from
own wealth relative to some wealth reference level (cf., among others, Corneo and
Jeanne (1997; 2001), Fisher and Hof (2000; 2005), Futagami and Shibata (1998),
Pham (2005)).
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3.1 Technology
A homogeneous output, y, is produced by capital according to the linear technology
(Rebelo (1991)):
y = Ak , A > 0 (1)
where y is gross production per capita, and k is capital per capita. The depreciation
rate of capital is δ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume (A−δ) ≥ ρ to ensure nonnegative endogenous
growth. Moreover, there is no population growth.
3.2 Preferences
The representative household has preferences for consumption c, relative consump-
tion ∆c ≡ c− c¯, wealth k, and relative wealth ∆k ≡ k− k¯. Relative consumption is
given by individual consumption relative to some consumption reference level c¯, and
relative wealth is given by individual wealth relative to some wealth reference level
k¯. Both reference levels (c¯, k¯) are exogenous from the point of view of an individual
household.16
The consumption and wealth reference levels are determined by two factors.
The first factor is mean consumption, c¯h, and mean wealth, k¯h, in the home (do-
mestic) economy (indicated by superscript h). As households are homogeneous,
mean consumption and mean wealth represent natural determinants for the refer-
ence levels. Importantly, these determinants are endogenous from the point of view
of the government (social planner). The second factor represents the consumption
and wealth, respectively, abroad: c¯f and k¯f , which are exogenous to the domestic
government. These international comparisons might be driven by interaction via
social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, or by television broadcasting.17 We
16All of the literature takes the reference levels to be exogenous for individual households. Ex-
ogeneity of the reference levels might be motivated by the fact that an individual household has
a negligible impact on them. Alternatively, households might not be aware of other households’
saving- and consumption decisions, thus, exogeneity might be the result of informational limita-
tions on the side of individual households.
17As highlighted in Section 2, globalization through technological advancements (via TV, inter-
net, social media, etc.) has led to awareness about living conditions of people in different countries,
and that has had significant impact on individual well-being, implying that an individual’s refer-
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begin by analyzing a one-country version of the model, where the foreign reference
measures are fully exogenous, and extend the analysis to a two-country setting in
Section 5 in which the foreign reference measures are endogenous (albeit treated as
exogenous by each national policy maker).
In what follows, we specify relative consumption ∆c and relative wealth ∆k as
∆c ≡ c− c¯ , c¯ = α
h c¯h + αf c¯f , αh, αf ∈ [0, 1], αh + αf = 1 , (2)
∆k ≡ k − k¯ , k¯ = β
h k¯h + βf k¯f , βh, βf ∈ [0, 1], βh + βf = 1 . (3)
Parameters αi and βi, i ∈ {h, f} determine the importance of the explained (en-
dogenous) versus not explained (exogenous) parts of the positional reference levels.
The standard case of fully endogenous mean value comparisons at the national level
is implied by αh = 1, αf = 0 and βh = 1, βf = 0.18 One way to think about the
composition of the aggregate reference level is in terms of openness or closedness
of a country with respect to international flows of goods, and information. In a
country that is closed in terms of international trade or in which information (e.g.,
media control by the government or restricted internet access) or the freedom of
international movement is restricted, (αf , βf ) might be low relative to (αh, βh). The
opposite occurs in a country that is open or unrestricted in the above-mentioned
respects.
In this paper, both relative consumption and relative wealth enter the utility
function. The instantaneous utility function is given by:
u(c,∆c, k,∆k) . (4)
For the given Ak technology, we may interpret the concern for relative wealth
also as a concern for relative income (Ak − Ak¯ = A∆k), as this gives rise to the
same general instantaneous utility function (4).
ence consumption is increasingly determined by consumption levels of people in other countries.
(See Becchetti et al. (2013), Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2015), and also Clark and Senik
(2010)).
18It is important to note that the reference levels, as specified above, are flow variables. Alterna-
tively, one could have specified them as stocks building up over time (as in Carroll et al. (1997)).
However, as demonstrated by Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007), the stock- and flow specifications
are equivalent (in terms of the qualitative results) along a balanced growth path.
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In our framework, labor supply is exogenous. That is why labor/leisure is not
an argument in the instantaneous utility function. The consequences of endogenous
labor supply for relative consumption concerns are well known from earlier studies.19
Instead, we focus on the intertemporal distortions that positional preferences might
bring about.
In the standard model, uc(c,∆c, k,∆k) > 0, and ui(c,∆c, k,∆k) = 0 for some i ∈
{∆c, k,∆k}, where a subscript to the utility function refers to the partial derivative,
i.e., uc(.) ≡ ∂ u(.)/∂c and similarly for the other arguments. If u∆c(c,∆c, k,∆k) >
0, preferences exhibit positional concerns for consumption. For a given other’s
consumption level (reference level), a rise in own consumption raises utility via
the increase in relative consumption. If uk(c,∆c, k,∆k) > 0, households derive
utility not only from consumption, but also from wealth (as in Weber (1930),
Pigou (1941), Markowitz (1952), Kurz (1968), Zou (1994; 1995), Kaplow (2009),
Nakamoto (2009), Kumhof et al. (2015), and Rehme (2017), among others)). Fi-
nally, if u∆k(c,∆c, k,∆k) > 0, preferences exhibit positional concerns for wealth. For
a given wealth reference level, a rise in own wealth raises relative wealth, thereby
it raises own utility. The time index t is suppressed, unless necessary, to simplify
the notation.
Throughout, we assume that the instantaneous utility function (4) is strictly
quasiconcave, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in c and weakly
increasing in all other arguments.
The intertemporal utility function, U , as viewed from date t = 0, is given by:
U =
∫
∞
t=0
u(c,∆c, k,∆k) e
−ρ tdt , ρ > 0 , (5)
where ρ is the household’s constant pure rate of time preference.
19See, among others, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010), Liu and Turnovsky (2005),
Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007).
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3.3 Market equilibrium
Let the superscript m indicate a market (decentralized) equilibrium. Households
choose a consumption stream so as to maximize intertemporal utility (5) subject
to:
k˙m = ym − cm − δkm = (A− δ)km − cm , (6)
km0 given , (7)
c¯m , k¯m exogenous , (8)
lim
t→∞
µmt k
m
t e
−ρ t = 0 . (9)
Differential equation (6) reflects the flow budget constraint of the representative
household. Notice that (6) and (7) hold for both the market framework and a
social optimum (as discussed below). Restriction (8) reflects the fact that individual
households consider the positionality reference levels as exogenous. Finally, (9) is
the transversality condition.
For the market economy, the current value Hamiltonian is given by:
Hm(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk , µ
m) = u(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + µ
m [(A− δ)km − cm], (10)
where the costate variable µm represents the shadow price of capital. An interior
solution implies the following first-order conditions:
µm = uc(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) , (11)
µ˙m
µm
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆k(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
uc(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
, (12)
where we made use of the fact that ∂∆c/∂ c = ∂ (c− c¯)/∂ c = 1 and ∂∆k/∂ k = 1
from the point of view of an individual household. Equation (11) is the conventional
first order condition for consumption, according to which the costate variable equals
the marginal utility of consumption at each point in time. Equation (12) states
that the growth rate of the costate variable equals the negative of the difference
between the rate of interest and the pure rate of time preference (as in the standard
model) plus an additional term that is due to the non-standard preferences. This
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additional term represents the marginal rate of substitution of capital (wealth) for
consumption. For the decentralized economy, an equilibrium path is characterized
by (6), (7), (9), (11), and (12).
Before discussing the welfarist and paternalist governments’ problems, it turns
out to be most useful to introduce the concept of the marginal degree of position-
ality (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002), as a measure of how status concerned or
positional an individual is. Specifically, the marginal degree of positionality with
respect to consumption is defined by
ζc ≡
u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
uc(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
. (13)
The degree of consumption positionality defines the fraction of utility gain from an
additional unit of consumption stemming from a rise in relative consumption ∆c. A
value of zero indicates no positionality at all, while a value of unity indicates that
only relative (not absolute) consumption matters. Likewise, we define the marginal
degree of positionality with respect to wealth by
ζk ≡
u∆k(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
uk(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆k(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
. (14)
These degrees of positionality will play an important role in the characterization of
corrective taxation in Subsection 4.3.
3.4 Welfarist Government
Let the superscript w indicate variables associated with a welfarist government’s
choice problem. A welfarist government respects individual preferences, including
the concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth. Since the welfarist gov-
ernment aims at internalizing the positional externalities, it takes into account that
c¯h = c in and k¯h = k in equilibrium. However, both c¯f and k¯f are considered
exogenous. From the point of view of this government, ∆c = c(1− α
h)− αf c¯f , and
∆k = k(1− β
h)− βf k¯f .
The welfarist government chooses a consumption stream so as to maximize in-
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tertemporal utility
U =
∫
∞
t=0
u(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) e
−ρ tdt , (15)
subject to
k˙w = (A− δ)kw − cw , (16)
kw0 given , (17)
c¯h = cw , k¯h = kw , (18)
lim
t→∞
µwt k
w
t e
−ρ t = 0 . (19)
Restrictions (16) – (19) have the same interpretations as those given for the market
economy. The main difference compared to the decentralized framework is the fact
that the social planner takes the reference levels (18) into account.
For the welfarist government, the current value Hamiltonian is given by:
Hw(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆wk , µ
w) = u(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + µ
w [(A− δ)kw − cw] . (20)
An interior solution implies the following first-order conditions:
µw = uc(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + (1− α
h) u∆c(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) , (21)
µ˙w
µw
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + (1− β
h) u∆k(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk )
uc(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + (1− α
h) u∆c(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk )
. (22)
The canonical equations (21) and (22) have the same interpretations as given for the
market economy above. The differences are given by the fact that the (welfarist)
government takes the “home components” of the aggregate reference levels into
account when deriving the optimality conditions. In other words, the (welfarist)
government takes into account that a part of consumption (saving) is wasteful
in terms of social welfare due to the (negative externality generating) positional
preferences. An equilibrium path is characterized by (16), (17), (19), (21), and
(22).
3.5 Paternalist Government
In this subsection, we consider a paternalist government that does not respect the
individuals’ concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth, although it is
17
assumed to respect all other aspects of consumer preferences. Therefore, instead
of forming the social objective upon the individuals’s actual preferences, and then
implementing a policy in order to internalize the positional externalities (as the
welfarist government does), the paternalist government wants the households to
behave as if these relative concerns were absent.20
It is worth to emphasize that we do not take a stand (in a normative sense) on
whether a government should follow a welfarist or a paternalist optimal policy. We
acknowledge that there are often good reasons to pursue a welfarist policy. In a way,
it seems natural to ask why a government would not implement what each individual
wants.21 There are, however, arguments in favor of a paternalist government as well.
First, as we mentioned in Section 2, several authors have argued against including
“anti-social” preferences, such as envy, in a social welfare function. It is, therefore,
relevant to compare the conventional welfarist approach to a paternalist approach
when measuring the distortions caused by relative concerns. Second, from an ethical
point of view, clearly there are indisputable boundaries regarding how far individual
preferences could extend, beyond which such preferences must not be considered in
any social welfare function.22 In general, these limits to individual behavior are often
difficult to define. An important point, though, is that regardless of the definition
of such boundaries, a paternalist government need not at all be totalitarian. A
paternalist government is very much compatible with a decentralized economy, in
which the government intervenes through economic policies designed to create the
appropriate incentives.
20That is, the government’s and households’ preferences differ under this criterion; see Kanbur
et al. (2006) for an excellent discussion, in a survey article on non-welfarist approaches to optimal
taxation.
21Also, from a “Political Economy” perspective, this seems reasonable. A democratically-elected
government that wants to be re-elected would be expected to propose a policy that the majority
agrees with.
22One might look back at the Rwandan genocide (which happened in 1994) soon after the then
President, a military leader, was killed in a plane crash. Armed groups of Hutus (over 80% of
the population) started slaughtering the minority Tutsis (about 15% of the population). Now,
assuming there was widespread support among the Hutu majority for ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi
minority, the social welfare function, appropriately weighted, would be expected to reflect such
sentiments under the welfarist welfare criterion. It is the paternalist welfare criterion that would
correct for such ’behavioral failures’ of individuals in this scenario.
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So, in our framework, a paternalist government does not fully respect individ-
ual preferences. In particular, the paternalist government attaches no social value
to changes in the individuals’ utilities caused by changes in the relative consump-
tion and relative wealth. This means that the paternalist government treats the
relative consumption and relative wealth as exogenous when solving its optimiza-
tion problem, even if these entities are (of course) endogenous in equilibrium. In
the following, variables related to the paternalist government’s choice problem are
indicated by the superscript p.
The paternalist government chooses a consumption stream so as to maximize
intertemporal utility
U =
∫
∞
t=0
u(cp, ∆¯c, k
p, ∆¯k) e
−ρ tdt , (23)
subject to
k˙p = (A− δ)kp − cp , (24)
kp0 given , (25)
∆¯c , ∆¯k exogenous , (26)
lim
t→∞
µptk
p
t e
−ρ t = 0 . (27)
The current value Hamiltonian can then be written as
Hp(cp, kp, µp) = u(cp, ∆¯c, k
p, ∆¯k) + µ
p [(A− δ)kp − cp] . (28)
By using that ∆¯c = ∆
p
c = c
p− c¯ and ∆¯k = ∆
p
k = k
p− k¯ in equilibrium (where c¯ and
k¯ are determined according to equations (2) and (3)), we can write the first-order
conditions for an interior solution as follows:
µp = uc(c
p,∆pc , k
p,∆pk) , (29)
µ˙p
µp
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
p,∆pc , k
p,∆pk)
uc(cp,∆
p
c , kp,∆
p
k)
. (30)
The canonical equations have the same general interpretation as the ones for the
welfarist government. In contrast to the welfarist government, however, the pa-
ternalist government disregards status concerns, and the canonical equations equal
those we would have for an economy without positional preferences.
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It is useful to compare (30) with (22) for the extreme case where αh = βh = 1
and αf = βf = 0. This is the case where the foreign components of the reference
consumption and reference wealth are totally absent, and thus the reference con-
sumption is nothing but the mean-value of home consumption. This means that
the social first-order conditions coincide for the welfarist and paternalist objectives,
which can be seen if we plug in αh = βh = 1 in (22): we then obtain (30). In
other words, the two types of government would make the same choice in this case,
albeit for different reasons. Intuitively, this is so because here, with all individuals
identical, the welfarist government would be able to fully internalize the externality
that each individual imposes on other people (because there is no exogenous foreign
component, which it would otherwise not be able to internalize). As the external-
ity coincides with the marginal behavioral failure of individuals (who are identical
and exhibit the same marginal degrees of positionality), the paternalist government
would want to impose the same policy as the welfarist government.23
4 Positional preferences: efficiency and
distortions
In this section, we address two cases. The first case is the special case in which
households have positional preferences only with respect to consumption. We de-
velop a necessary and sufficient condition for positional preferences to be non-
distortionary and consider the type of distortion occurring when this condition is
not satisfied. As an aside, we develop an existence condition for a balanced growth
path and show that existence does not imply efficiency (even for our framework
with exogenous labor supply). The results developed are essential for analyzing the
23As shown by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018), welfarist and paternalist governments
do not in general make the same choices, even if the reference levels are fully endogenous. For
instance, if the individuals were allowed to be heterogeneous, and if we continue to assume (i)
mean-value comparisons and (ii) that αh = βh = 1 and αf = βf = 0, the welfarist and paternalist
governments would typically make different choices. The reason is that the externality that each
individual imposes on other people would, in that case, be given by the average degree of position-
ality, while the individual’s own behavioral failure (as corrected by the paternalist government)
would be given by the individual’s own degree of positionality.
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general second case, in which households have positional preferences with respect
to both consumption and wealth. In the latter framework, we show that both the
type of government (welfarist versus paternalist) and the exogenous-endogenous
composition of the reference levels play decisive roles for whether or not positional
preferences are distortionary and if so, whether the distortion causes under- or
over-saving.
4.1 Positional concerns with respect to consumption
In this subsection, we focus on the case: u∆c(.) > 0, and u∆k(.) = 0. This is
the case in which households are not concerned about others’ wealth levels, i.e.,
households are positional with respect to consumption but not with respect to
wealth. However, households may still be concerned about own absolute wealth, in
which case uk(.) > 0. In order to sharpen our results, we distinguish uk(.) = 0 from
the case uk(.) > 0 in the following.
4.1.1 No preference for wealth: uk(.) = 0
We compare the equilibrium path of a market economy with those of the welfarist
and paternalist governments. From (12), (22) and (30), we see that
µ˙m
µm
=
µ˙w
µw
=
µ˙p
µp
= −[(A− δ)− ρ] , (31)
that is, the growth rates of the shadow prices are identical, and constant, in all
three frameworks (decentralized, welfarist-, and paternalist government). As a con-
sequence, we have µm = φw µw = φp µp, with both φw and φp being constants. The
ratio of any two costate variables is constant over time. From (11), (21) and (29),
we can identify
φw =
uc(c,∆c, ., .) + u∆c(c,∆c, ., .)
uc(c,∆c, ., .) + (1− αh) u∆c(c,∆c, ., .)
, φp =
uc(c,∆c, ., .) + u∆c(c,∆c, ., .)
uc(c,∆c, ., .)
.
(32)
In what follows, we argue that positional preferences with respect to consumption
are non-distortionary if and only if φw and φp are constant (time-invariant).
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Lemma 1. ζc(c,∆c, ., .) is a constant function if and only if
(i) u(c,∆c, ., .) is homogeneous of some degree R < 1 in (c,∆c, ., .), and
(ii) either u(c,∆c, ., .) is (a strictly increasing monotone transformation of) a linear
function, or c˙/c = c˙f/cf (equivalently cf = λc c, λc > 0 constant).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the Appendix we show, in detail, that the marginal degree of positionality
ζc(c,∆c, ., .) is a constant function for all homogeneous utility functions, once c
is growing at the same rate as cf (or u(c,∆c, ., .) is a linear function or a strictly
increasing monotone transformation thereof). The restriction R < 1 is required for
the marginal utility of individual consumption to decline in c.
Assumption 1 (A1). ζc(c,∆c, ., .) is a constant function, that is, ζ˙c(c,∆c, ., .) = 0.
Lemma 1 provides the conditions under which (A1) holds. One consequence of
Assumption (A1) is that the marginal rate of substitution of ∆c for c is constant. To
simplify notation in the analysis below, we define this marginal rate of substitution
between ∆c and c in terms of the marginal degree of positionality by
ξc ≡ ζc/(1− ζc) . (33)
If Assumption (A1) holds, ξc is constant, and u∆c = ξc uc. Throughout, we impose
the following parameter restriction
1 + ξc(1− α
h − λcαf ) ≥ 0 (34)
that ensures positivity of marginal utility of consumption when own individual
consumption and the consumption reference levels increase proportionately. This
restriction on the positional consumption externality asserts that either the exter-
nality augments the direct effect of own consumption, or, if it is offsetting, it is
dominated by the own effect (the direct positive effect of having more consumption
is not dominated by any negative effect due to positional preferences).
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Proposition 1 (u∆k(.) = uk(.) = 0).
Consider positional preferences with respect to consumption u∆c(c,∆c, ., .) > 0. As-
sumption (A1) is a necessary and sufficient assumption for the balanced growth path
of the decentralized economy to be efficient (undistorted), that is, it coincides with
the one implied by either the welfarist or the paternalist government.
Assume (A1) and c˙/c = c˙f/cf . Then, the endogenous growth rate of consumption
and capital, g, is given by
gm = gw = gp =
(A− δ)− ρ
(1−R)[1 + ξc(1− αh − λcαf )]
. (35)
Proof. Under Assumption (A1), as ζc(c,∆c, ., .) is constant, both φ
w = 1/(1−αh ζc)
and φp = 1/(1−ζc) – see (13), (14), (32) – are constant. Therefore, the requirement
for efficiency, constancy of φw and φp, is satisfied. Further details of the proof (in-
cluding the derivation of the endogenous growth rate) are shown in the Appendix.
Positional consumption preferences impose a consumption externality. Proposition
1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the positional consumption ex-
ternality to be non-distortionary: constancy of the marginal degree of positionality,
ζ˙c(c,∆c, ., .) = 0. The intuition behind this result is as follows. If the positional
consumption externality, as measured by ζc, is the same at each point in time, there
is no incentive for the consumer to reallocate the consumption over time in order to
keep up with the Joneses. Therefore, the positional consumption externality does
not introduce a distortion, as in Liu and Turnovsky (2005).24 This result is robust
with respect to both welfare criteria (paternalist and welfarist) and with respect
to the exogenous-endogenous composition of the reference level. The result is not,
however, robust with respect to having absolute wealth in the utility function. As
discussed below, the positional consumption externality always introduces a distor-
tion when uk > 0, u∆k = 0, and it may not introduce a distortion when uk > 0 and
u∆k > 0.
24A homogeneity condition was also introduced by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2006). However,
while their paper concentrates on habits, this paper focuses on positional preferences regarding
(relative) wealth. Proposition 1, though, is essential for the discussion of preferences for wealth.
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The technical requirements for Assumption (A1) to hold are given by Lemma
1. An example of a utility function satisfying these requirements is given by Fisher
and Heijdra (2009):
u(c,∆c, ., .) = ln
[
(1− α)c+ α∆c
1− α
]
.
In fact, this is an example of a strictly increasing monotone transformation of a
linear function, and ξc = (1− α)/α. An example of a utility function not generally
satisfying these requirements is given by Rauscher (1997):
u(c,∆c, ., .) =
c1−θ
1− θ
+ s(∆c) , θ > 0, s
′ > 0, s′′ < 0 .
Unless function s(∆c) is homogeneous of degree 1 − θ, this specification does not
satisfy the requirements stated in Lemma 1. If s(∆c) is not homogeneous of degree
1 − θ, u(c,∆c, ., .) is not homogeneous of some degree R. Thus ξ˙c(c,∆c, ., .) 6= 0,
and the positional consumption externality introduces an intertemporal distortion.
The fact that there is no distortion, when (A1) is satisfied, does not mean
that the positional consumption externality does not impact on consumption- and
savings behavior, on the c/k-ratio, or on the endogenous growth rate. All of these
are affected by the positional consumption externality, however, the effects are the
same in the decentralized economy as in the welfarist-/paternalist optimum.
This can best be seen by considering the endogenous growth rate, as reported in
Proposition 1. Notice that the growth rate is (negatively) related to the propensity
to consume out of total wealth, as c/k = (A − δ) − g, and savings represent the
endogenous growth engine. The growth rate is sensitive with respect to the posi-
tionality parameters. In particular, the growth rate decreases in ξc, and it increases
in αh and (λcαf ). The degree of positionality is given by ξc/(1+ξc) and rising in ξc.
A higher ξc (a higher ζc) raises consumption relative to savings in order to display
“status.” Consequently the saving rate falls, and so does the endogenous growth
rate. Next, a higher αh or (λcαf ) directly impacts on ∆c. In particular, for a given
increase in consumption, ∆c grows less the higher are α
h or (λcαf ). This, in turn,
lowers the rate of decline of the marginal utility of consumption (in equilibrium),
as shown in the appendix (Proof of Proposition 1, Step 1). The lower elasticity
of marginal utility (in absolute terms) raises the optimal growth rate, by standard
arguments of growth theory. Under (A1), while the positional consumption exter-
nality has an impact on the equilibrium (c/k, g), the impact is not distortionary,
according to Proposition 1.
We conclude this subsection by noting that the existence of a balanced growth
path does not imply that the resource allocation is efficient.
Proposition 2. Existence of a balanced growth path does not imply efficiency.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 reveals two important findings. First, there exist balanced growth
paths for which Assumption (A1) is not satisfied. In fact, as shown in the ap-
pendix, existence of a balanced growth path requires the utility function to be of
the following form:
v(c,∆c) = ∆
−γ
c
[
c1−θK1 +K2
1− θ
]
+Ψ(∆c) , K
1, K2 constants . (36)
If and only if utility is of form (36), there exists a balanced growth path. This growth
path, however, is efficient only under restrictions. For instance, if K2 6= 0, utility
function (36) is not homogeneous – thereby the necessary and sufficient efficiency
conditions (A1) is violated. One example for which consumption positionality does
not introduce a distortion is: K1 = 1, K2 = 0, and Ψ(∆c) is homogeneous of degree
(1− γ − θ). A specific example of this case is the example above (Rauscher, 1997),
with γ = 0, K1 = 1, K2 = 0, and Ψ(∆c) = s(∆c). For all functions s(∆c), there
exists a balanced growth path. But only for s(∆c) being homogeneous of degree
(1− θ), the balanced growth path is efficient.
Second, even if labor supply is exogenous, consumption positionality can in-
troduce an intertemporal distortion. This latter result is in stark contrast to the
literature analyzing consumption positionality in a neoclassical framework with de-
creasing returns to capital, showing that a consumption externality does not intro-
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duce any steady state distortion as long as labor supply is exogenous (although the
same externality may be distortive along the transitional path).25
In the present setting, with uc > 0, uk = 0 = u∆k , any corrective optimal tax
rate will be zero as long as Assumption (A1) is satisfied. As shown below, the only
purpose of corrective optimal taxation will be to ensure ζ˙c(c,∆c, ., .) = 0.
In what follows, we show that the result of Proposition 1 is not robust with
respect to preferences for absolute wealth (when, in addition, households are not
wealth-positional).
4.1.2 Preference for wealth: uk(.) > 0, u∆k(.) = 0
In contrast to the previous subsection, here we allow households to have a prefer-
ence for wealth. Households care about own wealth, uk(.) > 0, but they have no
positional preference for wealth, u∆k(.) = 0. Wealth in the form of capital is an ar-
gument in households’ utility functions, as in Kaplow (2009), Kumhof et al. (2015),
Kurz (1968), Markowitz (1952), Nakamoto (2009), Rehme (2017), Pigou (1941),
Weber (1930), and Zou (1994; 1995), among others. They argue that the incentive
for accumulating capital lies not only in maximizing long-run consumption, but also
to increase wealth, which in itself adds to agents’ utility. That is, individuals derive
utility from the mere possession of wealth and not simply its expenditure.26 We
relax this assumption in the subsequent subsection. To sharpen results, though, we
distinguish preferences for absolute wealth from positional preferences for wealth
(when u∆k(.) > 0).
25Brekke and Howarth (2002, p.142) argue that “we have established that augmenting a stan-
dard neoclassical growth model to incorporate a concern for relative consumption has no impacts
on long-run economic behavior.” Fisher and Hof (2000, p.249) show that the result that “relative
consumption does not affect the long-run steady state...is robust with respect to the specifica-
tion of the instantaneous utility function.” Liu and Turnovsky (2005, p.1106) state that “[w]ith
exogenous labor supply, consumption externalities, which impact through the labor-consumption
tradeoff, have no channel to affect steady state output” in a framework with neoclassical produc-
tion. Rauscher (1997, p.38) argues that “conspicuous consumption does not affect the long-run
steady state.”
26Wealth in the form of real money balances, which provide utility by facilitating transactions
and reducing shopping time, was introduced directly into the utility function in Ramsey-type
optimizing models (see e.g., Croushore, 1993).
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The steps followed here and in the next subsection resemble those of the above
discussion — with the right adjustments, though. There is no change with respect
to the marginal utilities of consumption, as given by (11), (21) and (29). With
uk(.) > 0, (12), (22) and (30) become:
µ˙m
µm
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
m,∆mc , k
m, .)
uc(cm,∆mc , k
m, .) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m, .)
, (37)
µ˙w
µw
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
w,∆wc , k
w, .)
uc(cw,∆wc , k
w, .) + (1− αh) u∆c(c
w,∆wc , k
w, .)
, (38)
µ˙p
µp
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
p,∆pc , k
p, .)
uc(cp,∆
p
c , kp, .)
. (39)
Following the above arguments, for equal consumption growth rates in the decen-
tralized economy as in the welfarist-/paternalist optimum to hold, the right hand
sides of (37), (38), and (39) must coincide, which essentially requires the private
and social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption to be equal.
More specifically, the private marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consump-
tion, evaluated in the social optimum based on the welfarist (w) and paternalist (p)
objective is given by
MRSik,c =
uk(c
i,∆ic, k
i, .)
uc(ci,∆ic, k
i, .) + u∆c(c
i,∆ic, k
i, .)
, i = w, p . (40)
Due to the relative concern for consumption, however, the consumers’ marginal
willingness to pay for wealth in terms of consumption differs from the corresponding
social marginal rates of substitution between wealth and consumption, which are
given as follows:
SMRSpk,c =
uk(c
p,∆pc , k
p, .)
uc(cp,∆
p
c , kp, .)
and
SMRSwk,c =
uk(c
w,∆wc , k
w, .)
uc(cw,∆wc , k
w, .) + (1− αh)u∆c(c
w,∆wc , k
w, .)
(41)
from the perspective of the paternalist (p) and welfarist (w) government.
Considering (40) and (41), we conclude:
Proposition 3 (uk(.) > 0, u∆k(.) = 0).
Suppose households have a preference for absolute wealth, but they are not wealth
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positional. If αh > 0, a positional consumption preference always introduces a dis-
tortion.
If αh = 0, the positional consumption preference introduces a distortion only ac-
cording to the paternalist welfare criterion but not according to the welfarist welfare
criterion.
If αh = 1, the distortion caused by the positional consumption preference is the same
for the welfarist and paternalist welfare criterion.
Proof. The results immediately follow from comparing (40) and (41) and noting
that positional concerns with respect to consumption introduce a distortion only
if the private and social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption
differ from each other. 
Proposition 3 shows that positional concerns with respect to consumption are
always distortionary, once households have a preference for absolute but not for rel-
ative wealth and αh > 0. This is true, independently of whether or not Assumption
(A1) is satisfied. The intuition is that the private marginal rate of substitution of
wealth for consumption always differs from the social one. This is so because, due to
the relative concerns for consumption, the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay
for wealth in terms of consumption differs from the corresponding social marginal
rates of substitution between wealth and consumption. Specifically, if αh > 0,
MRSik,c < SMRS
i
k,c, i = p, w. As individuals give up less consumption for an ad-
ditional unit of savings than would be optimal according to a welfarist/paternalist
optimal plan, they over-consume.
Consequently, over-consumption relative to a welfarist/paternalist optimal plan,
leads to under-saving. As savings drive the rate of growth, the private (market)
growth rate of consumption, wealth, and GDP (all of which are equal for all t in
our framework) is lower than the optimal growth rate for either a welfarist or an
paternalist government.
Comparing (40) and (41), it is easy to see that, for αh < 1, SMRCpk,c >
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SMRCwk,c. As a consequence, over-consumption as implied by a paternalist gov-
ernment is greater than over-consumption as implied by a welfarist government. In
other words, the endogenous growth rates rank according to: gp > gw > gm.
Proposition 3 states two special cases. First, if αh = 0, (40) and (41) coincide for
the welfarist government, as all of the externality is generated abroad and considered
fully exogenous by both the individual and the welfarist government. Second, if
αh = 1, the social marginal rates of substitution (41) coincide for the paternalist
and the welfarist government, as the externality generated by domestic households
(which the welfarist government aims at correcting for) equals the behavioral failure
of these households that the paternalist government aims at correcting for (see
Footnote 23). For these reasons, Proposition 3 gives rise to:
Corollary 1. Suppose households have a preference for absolute wealth, but they
are not wealth positional. Assume (A1):
If αh > 0, gm < gw < gp ; if αh = 0, gm = gw < gp ; if αh = 1, gm < gw = gp .
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 3. We consider thatMRSik,c > SMRS
i
k,c
implies over-consumption, thus, under-saving and therefore a lower than socially op-
timal endogenous growth rate. 
Proposition 3 or Corollary 1 may seem to suggest that consumption positionality
necessarily leads to over-consumption. However, this intuition is misleading, as the
over-consumption result neither necessarily holds in a framework without a prefer-
ence for absolute wealth, nor necessarily holds in a framework in which individuals
also have a positional preference for wealth (as will be discussed below).
With a preference for absolute wealth and no positional preference for wealth,
though, the market equilibrium implies over-consumption for both welfare criteria.
By not taking the externality into account, households overestimate the marginal
utility of consumption. That is, they have a lower marginal rate of substitution
of wealth for consumption than either the welfarist or the paternalist government.
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Consequently, in light of positional preferences with respect to consumption, house-
holds over-consume. In other words, households under-save, and the endogenous
growth rate in the market economy is smaller than that for a welfarist or paternalist
framework.
The difference between a welfarist and a paternalist government is given by the
fact that the welfarist one considers the marginal disutility from the endogenous
part of reference consumption, while the paternalist one fully disregards relative
consumption. In other words, the welfarist government takes into account that a
part of the consumption is wasteful, due to people having positional preferences,
while the paternalist government considers all over-consumption to be wasteful in
terms of social welfare.
So, ceteris paribus, marginal utility of consumption is higher for the welfarist
government than for the paternalist one. Consequently, the welfarist marginal rate
of substitution of wealth for consumption is higher than the paternalist one. This
implies over-consumption of the welfarist government relative to the paternalist
one. Equivalently, the saving rate is higher for the paternalist equilibrium than for
the welfarist one, implying gp > gw. The special cases discussed in Corollary 1
(αh = 0, 1) follow from the special cases stated in Proposition 3.
In what follows, we show that positional concerns with respect to wealth in-
troduce a further distortion that is capable of offsetting the distortionary effect of
relative consumption under wealth dependent preferences. Moreover, we show that
according to a welfarist government positional preferences may lead to one distor-
tion (say over-consumption) while, at the same time, they lead to the opposite
distortion (over-saving) according to a paternalist welfare criterion.
4.2 Positional concerns with respect to consumption and
wealth
We now turn to the general case in which households have positional preferences
not only with respect to consumption but also with respect to wealth. That is, we
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consider u∆c > 0 and u∆k > 0. We closely follow the argumentation developed so
far.
Lemma 2. ζk(c,∆c, k,∆k) is a constant function if and only if
(i) u(c,∆c, k,∆k) is homogeneous of some degree Rˆ < 1 in (k,∆k), and
(ii) either u(c,∆c, k,∆k) is (a strictly increasing monotone transformation of) a
linear function of (k,∆k), or k˙/k = k˙
f/kf (equivalently kf = λk k, λk > 0 constant).
Proof. The proof resembles that for Lemma 1 (see the Appendix). 
Assumption 2 (A2). ζk(c,∆c, k,∆k) is a constant function, that is, ζ˙k(c,∆c, k,∆k) =
0.
Lemma 2 provides the conditions under which (A2) holds. One consequence of
Assumption (A2) is that the marginal rate of substitution of k for ∆k is constant. To
simplify notation in the analysis below, we define this marginal rate of substitution
in terms of the marginal degree of positionality by
ξk ≡ ζk/(1− ζk) . (42)
If Assumption (A2) holds, ξk is constant, and u∆k = ξk uk. Throughout, we impose
the following parameter restriction
1 + ξk(1− β
h − λkβf ) ≥ 0 (43)
that ensures positivity of the marginal utility of wealth when own individual wealth
and the wealth reference levels increase proportionately. This restriction on the
positional wealth externality asserts that either the externality augments the direct
effect of own wealth, or, if it is offsetting, it is dominated by the own effect.
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) together imply that (i) u(c,∆c, k,∆k) = c
RkRˆuˆ,
with uˆ ≡ u(1, 1 − αh − λcαf , 1, 1 − βh − λkβf ) constant; (ii) ζc, ζk constant; (iii)
ξc, ξk constant; (iv) u∆c = ξcuc and u∆k = ξkuk; and (v) uk/uc = (Rˆ/R)/(c/k).
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As above, let
MRSik,c =
uk(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik) + u∆k(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)
uc(ci,∆ic, k
i,∆ik) + u∆c(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)
, i = w, p (44)
represent the private marginal rate of substitution between wealth and consump-
tion, evaluated in the social optimum based on the welfarist (w) and paternalist (p)
objective, respectively. Due to the relative concerns for consumption and wealth,
however, the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for wealth in terms of consump-
tion differs from the corresponding social marginal rates of substitution between
wealth and consumption, which are now given as follows:
SMRSpk,c =
uk(c
p,∆pc , k
p,∆pk)
uc(cp,∆
p
c , kp,∆
p
k)
and
SMRSwk,c =
uk(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk ) + (1− β
h)u∆k(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk )
uc(cw,∆wc , k
w,∆mk ) + (1− α
h)u∆c(c
w,∆wc , k
w,∆wk )
(45)
from the perspective of the paternalist (p) and welfarist (w) government. In the
following, we argue that consumption and wealth externalities do not introduce any
distortion if the private and social marginal rates of substitutions are identical.
Proposition 4 (Efficiency in spite of positional consumption and wealth external-
ities, when u∆k(.) > 0).
Assume (A1), (A2) and constancy of ∆c/c and ∆k/k.
(i) Paternalist government: If and only if ζk = ζc, the market equilibrium path is
efficient (according to the paternalist welfare criterion), and positional preferences
do not introduce a distortion.
(ii) Welfarist government: If and only if βh ζk = α
h ζc, the market equilibrium path
is efficient (according to the welfarist welfare criterion), and positional preferences
do not introduce a distortion.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 4 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for positional pref-
erences not to introduce a distortion. For special cases and in different contexts
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related conditions were discussed before (see Alonso-Carrera et al., 2006; Arrow
and Dasgupta, 2009; Nakamoto, 2009; Ghosh and Wendner, 2018). Proposition 4,
though, is in sharp contrast to the prior literature (Nakamoto 2009), which argues
that positional preferences for consumption always cause a distortion when house-
holds have a preference for wealth. The proposition offers conditions under which
positional preferences do not cause a distortion in spite of the fact that households
have a preference for wealth.
The intuition is the following. Under Assumption (A1), the positional consump-
tion externality is the same at each point in time, so there is no incentive for the con-
sumer to reallocate the consumption over time in order to keep-up-with-the-Joneses
in the consumption dimension. Under (A2), the positional wealth externality is the
same at each point in time. Therefore, if the assumptions underlying Proposition
4 are satisfied, the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the positional consumption
externality coincides with the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the positional
wealth externality, and there is no incentive to change the formation of wealth in
order to keep-up in the wealth dimension. This means that the incentives facing
the representative individual will coincide with those facing the planner under the
assumptions of Proposition 4. In other words, the two positional externalities (or
behavioral failures in the paternalist case) mirror each other. In this case, there is,
of course, no need for corrective taxes, as discussed below.
The conditions for the paternalist and welfarist governments coincide if αh =
βh = 1, such that ζk = ζc. The intuition is that in this case, the externality gen-
erated by domestic households equals the behavioral failure of these households,
as the average degree of positionality equals each individual’s own degree of po-
sitionality. However, if αh < 1 or βh < 1, the externality generated by domestic
households (as viewed by the welfarist government) is smaller than the behavioral
failure of these households (as viewed by the paternalist government). The pater-
nalist government attempts to internalize the same behavioral failure regardless of
whether the relative concerns are driven by domestic or foreign comparisons (or
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a combination thereof). Thus, in this case, the efficiency conditions, as stated in
Proposition 4, differ between the welfarist and paternalist governments.
Corollary 2 (u∆c(.) = 0, u∆k(.) > 0).
If preferences are positional with respect to wealth but not with respect to consump-
tion, the market equilibrium path is always inefficient, i.e., it never coincides with a
socially optimal one (regardless of whether individuals have a preference for absolute
wealth or not).
The corollary follows directly from the fact that ζk > ζc = 0. Preferences depend
on relative wealth but not on relative consumption. As there is no counteracting
positionality with respect to consumption, the positional preferences are always
distortionary. Specifically, positional preferences for wealth alone imply over-saving,
and the distortion is stronger in light of the paternalist welfare criterion than in
light of the welfarist welfare criterion.27 Considering that over-saving implies a
higher than optimal endogenous growth rate (of consumption, wealth and GDP),
gi, i = m,w, p, we conclude that gm > gw > gp.28
We conclude this subsection by analyzing the type of distortion (over-consumption
or over-saving) caused by positional preferences when the assumptions in Proposi-
tion 4 are not satisfied. Interestingly, we will see that positional preferences may
cause over-consumption according to one welfare criterion and, at the same time,
over-saving according to the other welfare criterion. Henceforth, ceteris paribus,
we may experience a higher than optimal endogenous growth rate according to one
welfare criterium, while experiencing a lower than optimal endogenous growth rate
according to the other welfare criterium.
Proposition 5 (Welfare criteria, and the endogenous parts of c¯ and k¯).
Assume (A1), (A2) and constancy of ∆c/c and ∆k/k. The positionality parameters
give rise to four cases.
27To see this formally, set u∆c = 0 in (45). The social marginal rate of substitution of wealth
for consumption is larger for a welfarist than for a paternalist government.
28Analytic expressions for the endogenous growth rates, including their derivations, are available
from the authors upon request.
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I. ζk = ζc and α
h = βh. There is no distortion according to either welfare criterion.
II. ζk = ζc. There is no distortion according to the paternalist welfare criterion.
There is a distortion according to the welfarist welfare criterion when αh 6= βh.
Specifically, αh > βh implies over-consumption; αh < βh implies over-saving.
III. ζk 6= ζc and α
h = βh. There is a distortion according to both welfare criteria.
Specifically, ξc > ξk implies over-consumption; ζc < ζk implies over-saving.
IV. ζk 6= ζc and α
h 6= βh.
IV.1 Let
1 >
ζk
ζc
>
αh
βh
.
Then positional preferences imply over-consumption according to the paternalist wel-
fare criterion and over-saving according to the welfarist welfare criterion.
IV.2 Let
1 <
ζk
ζc
<
αh
βh
.
Then positional preferences imply over-consumption according to the paternalist wel-
fare criterion and over-saving according to the welfarist welfare criterion.
Proof. We note that a negative (positive) difference between the private marginal
rate of substitution of wealth for consumption and the social marginal rate of sub-
stitution implies over-consumption (over-saving). Then, all cases follow directly
from comparing the private and social marginal rates of substitution as given by
(44) and (45), as well as from the formulations provided in the proof of Proposition
3. 
In Case I, the conditions of Proposition 4 are satisfied. Thus consumption- and
wealth externalities do not introduce any distortions.
In Case II, there is no distortion according to the paternalist government, as the
behavioral failures from consuming too much (because ζc > 0) exactly compensate
the behavioral failure stemming from saving too much (because ζk > 0): the wealth
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positionality exactly offsets the consumption positionality (according to Proposition
4), and the individuals act as if preferences were non-positional.
The same does not hold for the welfarist government (which considers external-
ities but not behavioral failures). By internalizing different amounts of the wealth
and consumption externalities (αh 6= βh), the welfarist government’s marginal rate
of substitution of wealth for consumption differs from that of individual house-
holds, as well as from that of the paternalist government. If, for example, αh > βh,
the welfarist government has a higher marginal rate of substitution of wealth for
consumption (by internalizing relative consumption by more than relative wealth)
as compared to individual households. Therefore, individual households choose a
higher consumption-to-capital ratio than a welfarist government. In other words,
households over-consume relative to the welfarist government. Over-consumption
then implies a lower than optimal endogenous growth rate.
In Case III, ζk 6= ζc (with α
h = βh) always introduces a distortion, and the
distortion is stronger according to the paternalist welfare criterion compared to the
welfarist one. Clearly, ζc > ζk implies over-consumption, as individual households
are more positional with respect to consumption than with respect to wealth com-
pared with both governments. A parallel argument applies to the case in which
ζc < ζk.
In Case IV, we show that, depending on the shares (αh, βh), positional pref-
erences may imply over-consumption according to one welfare criterion and over-
saving according to the other welfare criterion. The intuitive reason is that a pa-
ternalist government only considers the marginal degrees of positionality (ζc, ζk),
while a welfarist government only considers the effective marginal degrees of posi-
tionality (αh ζc, β
h ζk). Whenever (ζc > ζk) and (α
h ζc < β
h ζk), or (ζc < ζk) and
(αh ζc > β
h ζk), the two welfare criteria disagree, and there is overconsumption ac-
cording to one criterium but, at the same time, over-saving according to the other
criterium.
Cases IV.1 and IV.2 raise serious questions regarding the (optimal) policy re-
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sponses to positional preferences. While these cases are consistent from an economic
standpoint, the question is whether a government should follow a welfarist or a pa-
ternalist welfare criterion upon which to base its policy analysis. An answer to
this question has to be dictated by philosophical considerations ultimately. In fact,
depending on the answer to this question, a government should apply one set of
optimal policies rather than another one. In particular, in the presence of positional
preferences, under the conditions of Case IV.1, a paternalist government should ap-
ply a consumption tax while a welfarist government should apply a tax on capital
income in order to correct for the same externalities. The reverse holds for Case
IV.2.
4.3 Tax Policy Implications
Let us now turn to the optimal tax policy implications of the social comparisons
described above. A welfarist government would like to internalize the positional ex-
ternalities that the relative consumption and wealth concerns give rise to, whereas
the paternalist government would like each individual to behave as if these con-
cerns were absent. As such, the two types of government have different reasons to
intervene.
To simplify the interpretation, and connect the analysis to the results presented
in Proposition 4, we consider a case where Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are satisfied.
Under Assumptions (A1) and (A2), the two market (behavioral) failures reduce to
a single effective distortion. As such, we only need one properly designed corrective
tax instrument combined with the lump-sum repayment of the tax revenue. We
exemplify by considering a capital income tax policy.29 The asset accumulation
equation facing each individual at any time t can now be written as (if we suppress
the time indicator for notational convenience)
k˙m = (A− δ)km(1− τ)− cm + T (46)
29We could alternatively use a wealth tax or a consumption tax, which would give optimal policy
rules very similar to those in Proposition 6.
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where τ denotes the capital income tax and T represents a lump-sum transfer
(positive or negative). Since the individuals are identical by assumption, the only
role of the welfarist (paternalist) government is to correct for market (behavioral)
failures; therefore, since the timing of the lump-sum transfer is not important here,
we assume that the government’s budget constraint balances at each instant, such
that
τ(A− δ)k = T. (47)
In addition to conditions (6), (7), (8), and (9), the necessary conditions character-
izing the decentralized economy are given by equation (46) along with the following
equations:
µm = uc(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) , (48)
µ˙m
µm
= −[(A− δ)(1− τ)− ρ]−
uk(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆k(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
uc(cm,∆mc , k
m,∆mk ) + u∆c(c
m,∆mc , k
m,∆mk )
.(49)
We follow Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010, 2018) by character-
izing the corrective tax policy in terms of degrees of positionality (which can be
empirically estimated), which are constant under Assumptions (A1) and (A2). In
our model, which distinguishes between consumption positionality and wealth posi-
tionality, we defined these degrees as follows in Section 3: ζc = u∆c/(uc + u∆c) and
ζk = u∆k/(uk + u∆k). By using the private and social marginal rates of substitu-
tion between wealth and consumption given in equations (44) and (45), the optimal
tax policy response to relative consumption and wealth concerns is summarized in
Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Suppose that Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are satisfied. If τ satis-
fies
τ(A− δ) = MRSpk,c − SMRS
p
k,c = MRS
p
k,c
ζk − ζc
1− ζc
(50)
for all t, then cm = cp and km = kp for all t, such that the market economy replicates
the paternalist government’s preferred resource allocation.
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If τ instead satisfies
τ(A− δ) = MRSwk,c − SMRS
w
k,c = MRS
w
k,c
βhζk − α
hζc
1− αhζc
(51)
for all t, then cm = cw and km = kw for all t, such that the market economy
replicates the welfarist government’s preferred resource allocation.
Proof: see the Appendix. 
Starting with tax policy chosen by the paternalist government, we can see that the
optimal corrective tax depends on a discrepancy between MRSpk,c and SMRS
p
k,c.
If the private marginal rate of substitution exceeds the social marginal rate of
substitution, such that MRSpk,c > SMRS
p
k,c, then τ > 0. The intuition is that
the tendency to over-accumulate wealth (due to wealth positionality) dominates
the tendency to over-consume (due to consumption positionality), in which case
an uncontrolled market economy would lead to more wealth accumulation at each
point in time than preferred by the paternalist government. A capital income
tax based on the policy rule given in equation (50) internalizes this behavioral
failure. Correspondingly, if the MRSpk,c < SMRS
p
k,c, the behavioral failure implied
by consumption positionality dominates the behavioral failure implied by wealth
positionality, in which case equation (50) would imply τ < 0.
The final term on the right hand side of equation (50), i.e., the expression
after the second equality, expresses the policy rule for the capital income tax in
terms of the degrees of consumption and wealth positionality. The interpretation is
straightforward: we should tax capital income if the degree of wealth positionality
exceeds the degree of consumption positionality, i.e., if ζk > ζc, and subsidize capital
income if the degree of wealth positionality instead falls short of the degree of
consumption positionality such that ζk < ζc. The intuition is that the strength
of each behavioral failure is captured by the degree of positionality, and since the
two behavioral failures exhibit a negative correlation, the net behavioral failure
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(captured by the difference between the two degrees of positionality) determines
the sign of the corrective tax. We can also see that the corrective tax is zero
for all t if, and only if, ζk = ζc, in which case the two behavioral failures cancel
out. In that case, the consumers would behave in exactly the same way as the
paternalist government wants them to do, which corresponds to the result presented
in Proposition 4 (i).
Continuing with the tax policy implemented by the welfarist government given
in equation (51), the sign of the optimal capital income tax will also in this case de-
pend on a discrepancy between the private and social marginal rates of substitution
between wealth and consumption. As such, the expression after the first equality in
equation (51) is interpretable in exactly the same way as the corresponding expres-
sion in equation (50). However, in the welfarist case, the discrepancy between these
two marginal rates of substitution cannot be directly translated in to a difference
between the two degrees of positionality. This is so because the government only in-
ternalizes the domestic component of each positional externality. In a welfarist con-
text, we can interpret the degree of wealth positionality, ζk, in terms of the marginal
positional wealth externality per unit of wealth, and the government internalizes
the domestic fraction, βh, of this externality. Similarly, the degree of consump-
tion positionality, ζc, measures the marginal positional consumption externality per
unit of consumption, and the government internalizes the domestic fraction, αh,
of this externality. From the perspective of a national welfarist government, the
net marginal externality is, therefore, given by βhζk − α
hζc. If this difference is
positive (negative), the optimal wealth tax is positive (negative). In other words,
the larger the positional wealth externality (ζk) or the larger the fraction of this
externality that the government internalizes (βh), ceteris paribus, the higher will be
the optimal capital income tax. Conversely, the larger the positional consumption
externality (ζc) or the larger the fraction of this externality that the government
internalizes (αh), ceteris paribus, the lower will be the optimal capital income tax.
Note also that the two ”effective externalities” cancel out if βhζk = α
hζc, in which
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case the positional concerns do not give rise to any distortion. This corresponds to
the result in Proposition 4 (ii) and implies that the corrective tax is zero.
The reason why a single tax can be used to correct for two imperfections is that
(i) c and k exhibit a negative correlation, meaning that a single capital income tax
can be used to reach the desired expression for µ˙/µ, and (ii) the marginal utility
of relative consumption stands in a fixed proportion, ξc, to the marginal utility of
absolute consumption if Assumption (A1) is satisfied. The latter means that the
socially optimal resource allocation will satisfy the atemporal first-order condition
for consumption in the market economy, which would not be the case in a more gen-
eral setting that does not rely on Assumptions (A1) and (A2). Instead, this general
case typically requires two corrective taxes to reach the desired resource allocation,
irrespective of whether this allocation is decided on by a welfarist or paternalist
government. It is straightforward to show that a capital income tax similar to
those described above (albeit adjusted for the fact that the degrees of positionality
are endogenous when Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are not satisfied) together with
a consumption tax (designed to induce the desired atemporal first-order condition
for consumption) can be used to implement the desired social optimum.
5 Extension to a Global Economy
Contrary to earlier sections, which focus on a single country and treat “the rest
of the economy” (the rest of the “world”) as exogenous, this section extends the
analysis to a global economy with two countries. In this setting, the foreign part
of the reference measures for consumption and wealth, respectively, have natural
interpretations in terms of the consumption and wealth of individuals in the other
country.30 The purpose is to examine to what extent national policy-making, as
reflected in the choices made by the national governments in the preceding sections,
30The number of countries (as long as it exceeds one) is not important for the results to be
presented below. Without loss of generality, therefore, we consider the simplest possible case with
only two countries.
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is able to internalize market and behavioral failures also on a global (multi-country)
level. In other words, we shall briefly discuss whether positional consumption and
wealth preferences are still distortive on a global level, despite the national gov-
ernments having made their optimal choices. The benchmark is thus an optimal
resource allocation from the perspective of a global social planner, whose objective
is based on welfarism and paternalism, respectively, as formalized above.
With a welfarist social planner, a global social optimum can be derived by choos-
ing consumption streams to maximize the following sum of intertemporal utilities
(for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i):
U =
∫
∞
t=0
2∑
ℓ=1
u(cℓ,∆ℓc, k
ℓ,∆ℓk) e
−ρ tdt (52)
subject to
k˙i = (A− δ)ki − ci , (53)
ki0 = k
j
0 given , (54)
c¯i = αhci + αfcj , k¯i = βhki + βfkj , (55)
∆ic = c
i − c¯i, ∆ik = k
i − k¯i (56)
lim
t→∞
µitk
i
te
−ρ t = 0. (57)
Except for the country indicators, the notation is the same as before. To be able
to focus on the distortions caused by positional preferences in the simplest possible
way, the above decision-problem assumes that the countries are identical. This
allows us to abstract from redistribution policies at the international level, which
are not essential for the nature of the positional externalities involved.31 If the
global social planner is paternalist, the instantaneous utility function in equation
(52) is replaced by u(cℓ, ∆¯ℓc, k
ℓ, ∆¯ℓk) for ℓ = 1, 2, where ∆¯
ℓ
c and ∆¯
ℓ
k are treated as
exogenous during optimization albeit endogenous in equilibrium (such that ∆¯ℓc = ∆
ℓ
c
and ∆¯ℓk = ∆
ℓ
k). Furthermore, restriction (55) is redundant in the paternalist case.
31Instead of assuming that the initial capital stocks are equal, an alternative way of deriving
Proposition 7 would be to assume a redistribution policy by adding a lump-sum subsidy to each
country, T i, along with a budget constraint for the global social planner, T 1 = −T 2.
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By using the approach presented in Section 4, the social optimum is character-
ized in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Based on the decision-problem (52)-(57), and irrespective of whether
the global social planner is welfarist or paternalist, the global social optimum satisfies
the following conditions:
µ = µi = uc(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik), (58)
µ˙
µ
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)
uc(ci,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)
. (59)
for i = 1, 2.
Proof: see the Appendix. 
The result given in Proposition 7 arises because the two countries are identical,
meaning that c1 = c2 and k1 = k2. Therefore, the externalities that the global wel-
farist planner internalizes coincide with the behavioral failures that the paternalist
planner corrects for.
We can now compare the global social optimum characterized in Proposition 7
with the Nash-equilibrium allocation that would follow if (i) the policies were based
on national objectives and (ii) each national social planner treats the decision-
variables of the other country as exogenous. Such an allocation would imply that
each country satisfies equations (21) and (22) or equations (29) and (30), depending
on whether the national decision-makers are welfarist or paternalist governments.
More specifically, and in addition to (53)-(57), Nash-competition among welfarist
national governments satisfies the conditions
µi = uc(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik) + (1− α
h) u∆c(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik) , (60)
µ˙i
µi
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik) + (1− β
h) u∆k(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)
uc(ci,∆ic, k
i,∆ik) + (1− α
h) u∆c(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)
, (61)
whereas Nash-competition among paternalist national governments satisfies
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µi = uc(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik), (62)
µ˙i
µi
= −[(A− δ)− ρ]−
uk(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)
uc(ci,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)
, (63)
for i = 1, 2. Since the two countries are identical by assumption, both equations
(60) and (61) and equations (62) and (63) imply c1 = c2 and k1 = k2 (even if the
levels typically differ between the two resource allocations). The following corollary
is a direct consequence of Proposition 5 and equations (60)-(63):
Corollary 3. Within the given framework, Nash-competing paternalist governments
would always implement the global social optimum. Under Assumptions (A1) and
(A2), Nash-competing welfarist governments would implement the global social op-
timum if, and only if, (1− ζc α
h)/(1− ζc) = (1− ζk β
h)/(1− ζk).
Therefore, whereas the choices made by Nash-competing paternalist national gov-
ernments lead to a global social optimum, Nash-competition among welfarist na-
tional governments does not in general lead to a globally optimal resource allocation.
The intuition is, of course, that the behavioral failure of each individual, which the
paternalist government wants to correct for, is the same regardless of whether the
social comparisons have an international dimension. In the welfarist case, on the
other hand, the national governments only internalize the domestic parts of the two
externalities, implying that the resource allocation implemented by Nash-competing
welfarist governments will typically differ from the allocation preferred by a global
social planner. If the extent to which the relative concerns are based on domestic
comparisons is the same for consumption and wealth such that αh = βh < 1, then
Nash-competing welfarist governments would implement the global social optimum
if, and only if, the degrees of consumption positionality and wealth positionality
are equal. A more distinct special case arises if αh = βh = 1, in which the welfarist
allocation coincides with the global social optimum. Since empirical research on
relative concerns and well-being has started to discern social reference groups, as
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well as estimated degrees of positionality for consumption and for certain aspects
of wealth (or related durable goods), an interesting and feasible topic for future
research would be to examine whether these conditions are close to being satisfied.
6 Conclusions
In the context of an endogenous growth model with exogenous labor supply, and in
the presence of positional preferences for wealth in addition to consumption, this pa-
per addresses the important research question as to whether positional preferences
are distortionary, and if so, whether they lead to over-consumption or over-saving.
The paper shows that the answer depends on three main factors: the characteristics
of the utility function (the constancy of the degree of positionality of consumption
and/or wealth); the extent to which the relative concerns reflect comparisons with
people in other countries; and the nature of the welfare criterion (welfarist or pa-
ternalist). Based on the same two welfare criteria, we also address corrective tax
policy in order to internalize the welfare costs of relative consumption and wealth
concerns.
When households are positional, they compare their own consumption and
wealth to reference points. These reference points are in part determined by the
equilibrium in the home economy (e.g., the mean consumption in the domestic
economy), and also in part by choices made in other countries which the domestic
government is assumed to treat as exogenous. It turns out that this “endogenous-
exogenous composition”of reference levels plays a key role for whether positional
preferences imply over-consumption or over-saving according to a welfarist govern-
ment. This is because individual households consider reference levels as exogenous,
while a welfarist government internalizes the endogenous parts of the reference lev-
els. Depending on the relative size of the foreign component in each reference
measure, a welfarist government can have a higher- or a lower marginal rate of
substitution of wealth for consumption than an individual household.
In contrast to a neoclassical growth framework, typically considered in the
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literature, we show in our endogenous growth set-up that positional preferences
may introduce intertemporal distortions in spite of the labor supply being exoge-
nous. Had labor supply been determined endogenously, intra-temporal distortions
would be present in addition to the intertemporal distortions analyzed here. For
instance, when households exhibit a preference for absolute wealth (but not a po-
sitional preference for wealth), then consumption positionality always introduces
over-consumption (under both a welfarist and a paternalist government), and this
we believe is an important contribution to the literature. If, in addition, households
also have a preference for relative wealth, i.e., they are wealth-positional, then some
conditions need to be satisfied for positional preferences in such a framework to be
non-distortionary, and we provide those necessary and sufficient conditions in our
paper.
Three of our results stand out, in particular. First, when the endogenous-
exogenous composition is the same for both the consumption and the wealth ref-
erence levels, the distortion of positional preferences is typically stronger under a
paternalist government than under a welfarist one. This is because the former com-
pletely disregards any positional preferences in its social welfare function, while the
latter only internalizes the domestic part of the positional externalities. As a conse-
quence, a paternalist government typically implements a higher capital income tax
than a welfarist government in order to correct for the welfare costs of relative con-
sumption and wealth concerns. Second, we identify the (apparently contradictory,
yet economically logical) cases for which distortions caused by positional prefer-
ences imply over-consumption according to the welfarist criterion, while implying
over-saving according to the paternalist criterion. These cases involve restrictions
on the degrees of positionality as well as on the endogenous-exogenous composi-
tions of the reference levels. Third, by extending the analyses to a global economy
where the foreign reference levels (for consumption and wealth) are endogenous, and
if we abstract from distributional concerns, we show that Nash-competing pater-
nalist governments implement the global social optimum, whereas Nash-competing
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welfarist governments do not.
Several further research questions, not addressed in this study, are potentially
significant and interesting. First, if households are heterogeneous in terms of wealth,
skills, or preferences, what can be said about the simultaneous distortions created
by consumption and wealth positionality, and what would be the optimal tax policy
implications thereof? How would the corrective motives for taxation analyzed above
interact with the redistributive elements of the tax system? Second, empirical re-
search is required to provide further evidence about the degrees of positionality and
to produce estimates for both the home country’s and the foreign country’s impor-
tance in the formation of an individual’s reference levels of consumption and wealth.
These estimates will typically vary between individuals and between countries. As
a consequence, optimal corrective policies are likely to vary across countries as well.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
According to definition (13), ζc(c,∆c, ., .) is a constant function if and only if the
marginal degree of substitution of c for ∆c is constant for all (c,∆c, ., .). Homogene-
ity (homotheticity) requirement (i) ensures that this marginal degree of substitution
is a function of the ratio ∆c/c. The restriction of the degree of homogeneity to R < 1
ensures declining marginal utility of individual consumption.
There are two possible cases. First, u(c,∆c, ., .) is a strictly increasing monotone
transformation of a linear function. In this case (in addition of u(c,∆c, ., .) being
homothetic), the marginal degree of substitution is a constant (independent of the
ratio ∆c/c). Obviously, in this case the marginal degree of substitution of c for ∆c
is constant for all (c,∆c, ., .).
Second, c˙/c = c˙f/cf (equivalently cf = λc c, λc > 0 constant). By homogeneity,
the marginal degree of substitution of c for ∆c is a function of the ratio ∆c/c. If
c˙/c = c˙f/cf , then c˙/c = ∆˙c/∆c, as can easily be calculated from (2). In equilibrium,
∆c = c − α
h c − αfcf = c(1 − αh) − αf λc c, where the right-hand-side formulation
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holds true if and only if c˙/c = c˙f/cf . Under this assumption, ∆c = c[(1−α
h)−αf λc].
Log-differentiation, under this assumption, yields c˙/c = ∆˙c/∆c. Consequently, the
ratio ∆c/c is a constant. 
Proof of Proposition 1
We consider km0 = k
w
0 = k
p
0. It is easy to show that – as in the standard Ak frame-
work – the dynamic system is one-dimensional, and the steady state is unstable.
That is, there is no transitional dynamics, and consumption and capital grow at
their balanced growth rates “from the beginning.” This argument follows standard
textbook reasoning.
Step 1. Consumption and capital grow at the same rate. We show that the en-
dogenous growth rate of the market economy equals that of the (welfarist- and
paternalist) government: gm = gw = gp.
Given that consumption and capital grow at their balanced growth rates “from
the beginning,” k˙/k is constant, and (6) requires c to grow at the same rate as
k. Let g denote this growth rate. In the following we show that g = c˙/c is
the same for the decentralized economy as for the welfarist-/paternalist govern-
ment. As a matter of fact, although µm 6= µw 6= µp, from (11), (21), (29) it
follows that the growth rates of the costate variables (being the same) all equal:
µ˙m/µm = µ˙w/µw = µ˙p/µp = u˙c/uc. This is due to Assumption (A1), according to
which u∆c = ξc uc, where ξc ≡ ζc/(1 − ζc) is a constant. This implies in particular
that the growth rate u˙c/uc is independent of whether or not c¯ or ∆¯c is exogenous
to the decision maker. That is, for the market economy as well as for both govern-
ments,
µ˙
µ
=
u˙c
uc
=
uccc
uc
c˙
c
+
uc∆cc
uc
∆˙c
c
.
Next, we observe that (i) ∆˙c/c = (1−α
h−λcαf )c˙/c; (ii) uc∆c = u∆cc = ∂ u∆c/∂ c =
∂ ξcuc/∂ c = ξcucc; (iii) by homogeneity of degree R, uccc/uc = −(1−R). Consider-
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ing (i) to (iii) together with (31) yields
gi =
(
c˙
c
)i
=
(A− δ)− ρ
(1−R)[1 + ξc(1− αh − λcαf )]
, i ∈ {m,w, p} . (64)
Step 2. As gm = gw = gp we have cmt = c
w
t = c
p
t for all t ≥ 0. For t = 0, observe that
km0 = k
w
0 = k
p
0. From (6), (16) and (24), c0 = [(A− δ)− g] k0. As k
m
0 = k
w
0 = k
p
0, it
follows that cm0 = c
w
0 = c
p
0. Finally, as the growth rates are identical, we also have
cmt = c
w
t = c
p
t for all t > 0.
Step 3. The transversality conditions (TVC) are satisfied. Let uˆ ≡ u(1, 1 − αh −
λcαf , ., .). We have µm = R(1 + ξc)uˆc
R−1 6= µw = R(1 + ξc(1 − α
h))uˆcR−1 6= µp =
RuˆcR−1. Next we consider µit = µ
i
0 e
−[(A−δ)−ρ]t, i ∈ {m,w, p}, ct = c0 e
gt, and
kt = k0 e
gt. Plugging these expressions into the respective TVC yields the following
necessary and sufficient condition for the TVC (in all three frameworks) to be
satisfied: (A− δ) > g. This condition, however, is satisfied in all three frameworks
(market, welfarist, paternalist), as c/k = (A− δ)− g > 0.
From steps 1 to 3 we conclude that all equilibrium paths are identical, therefore the
decentralized equilibrium path is efficient (indeed optimal) according to either the
welfarist or the paternalist welfare criterion. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Let v(c,∆c) ≡ u(c,∆c, ., .). Throughout we assume that (c = λ
ccf )⇔ (c˙/c = c˙f/cf )
is satisfied. Efficiency requires
v∆c(c,∆c)
vc(c,∆c)
= constant , (EF)
and existence of a balanced growth path requires a constant growth rate of the
costate variable:
µ˙
µ
=
vcc(c,∆c)c
vc(c,∆c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
=constant
c˙
c
+
vc∆c(c,∆c)∆c
vc(c,∆c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
=constant
∆˙c
∆c
= constant . (EX)
49
Both c˙/c and ∆˙c/∆c are constant on a balanced growth path. The existence con-
dition is satisfied if both elasticities of marginal utility are constant as well.
As demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1, efficiency condition (A1) implies
constancy of both elasticities of marginal utility. That is, (EF)⇒ (EX). The reverse
does not hold, though.
Assume (EX), and let θ and γ denote the elasticities:
θ ≡ −
vcc(c,∆c)c
vc(c,∆c)
, γ ≡ −
vc∆c(c,∆c)∆c
vc(c,∆c)
. (65)
From this information, we first derive the marginal utility of consumption. In the
proceeding step, we use the result to infer the utility function.
Step 1. Marginal utility
vc∆c(c,∆c)
vc(c,∆c)
=
d
d∆c
ln vc(c,∆c) = −
γ
∆c
⇒
∫
d
d∆c
ln vc(c,∆c) d∆c = −
∫
γ
∆c
d∆c = −γ ln∆c + ξ
⇒ ln vc(c,∆c) + fˆ(c) = −γ ln∆c + ξ
⇒ ln vc(c,∆c) = ln(∆
−γ
c ) + f(c) , f(c) ≡ ξ − fˆ(c)
⇒ eln vc(c,∆c) = eln(∆
−γ
c ) ef(c)
⇒ vc(c,∆c) = ∆
−γ
c e
f(c) ,
where ξ and fˆ(c) are constants of integration.
Step 2. Utility. Integrating the above with respect to c yields:
∫
d
d c
v(c,∆c)dc = ∆
−γ
c
∫
ef(c)dc︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ϕ(c)
⇒ v(c,∆c)−Ψ(∆c) = ∆
−γ
c ϕ(c)
⇒ v(c,∆c) = ∆
−γ
c ϕ(c) + Ψ(∆c) ,
where Ψ(∆c) is a constant of integration. Next, we use constancy of the elasticity
of marginal utility again, to obtain an expression for ϕ(c). Solving the differential
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equation, vccc/vc = ϕccc/ϕc = θ, yields:
ϕ(c) =
c1−θK1
1− θ
+ Kˆ2
where K1 and Kˆ2 are arbitrary constants of integration. Setting Kˆ2 = K2/(1− θ)
yields (36). 
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the private and social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for con-
sumption, (44) and (45). Considering the definitions of ζc and ζk, (13) and (14), we
can express the social marginal rates of substitution by:
SMRSpk,c = MRS
p
k,c
1− ζk
1− ζc
,
SMRSwk,c = MRS
w
k,c
1− βh ζk
1− αh ζc
.
Hence, the differences between the private and social marginal rates of substitution
are given by
MRSpk,c − SMRS
p
k,c = MRS
p
k,c
ζk − ζc
1− ζc
,
MRSwk,c − SMRS
w
k,c = MRS
w
k,c
βh ζk − α
h ζc
1− αh ζc
.
Those differences equal zero (no distortion), when ζk = ζc (paternalist government)
or βh ζk = α
h ζc (welfarist government), which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 6
With the taxes described in (50) and (51), which are based on Assumptions (A1)
and (A2), it follows that the market equilibrium (m) as well as the welfarist (w)
and paternalist (p) social optima all satisfy
µ˙
µ
= −[(A− δ)(1− τ)− ρ]−
uk(c,∆c, k,∆k)
uc(c,∆c, k,∆k)
. (66)
Therefore, µm = φwµw = φpµp, where φw and φp are constants. Based on Assump-
tion (A1), we can calculate φw = (1 + ξc) /
(
1 + (1− αh)ξc
)
and φp=(1 + ξc). By
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using the first-order condition for consumption in the market economy,
uc(c,∆c, k,∆k) (1 + ξc) = µ
m, we can see that this condition coincides with the
first-order condition for consumption in the welfarist optimum if the corrective tax
is given by equation (51), and coincides with that of the paternalist optimum if
the corrective tax is instead given by equation (50). Consequently, since the three
regimes satisfy the same type of equation of motion and initial condition for the
capital stock as well as the same type of transversality condition, it follows that the
market economy replicates the welfarist optimum if the corrective tax is given by
equation (51), and the paternalist optimum if the corrective tax is given by equation
(50). 
Proof of Proposition 7
With a paternalist planner at the global level, a social optimum satisfies the follow-
ing first-order conditions:
uc(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik) = µ
i (67)
µ˙i = −µi[(A− δ)− ρ]− uk(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik), (68)
whereas a welfarist planner satisfies the corresponding conditions
uc(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik) + (1− α
h)u∆c(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)− α
fu∆c(c
j,∆jc, k
j,∆jk) (69)
µ˙i = −µi[(A− δ)− ρ]− (1− βh)uk(c
i,∆ic, k
i,∆ik)− β
fuk(c
j,∆jc, k
j,∆jk) (70)
for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. Since the two countries are identical, and αh + αf =
βh + βf = 1, equations (67)-(68) and equations (69)-(70) are equivalent. As such,
and irrespective of whether the global social planner is welfarist or paternalist, the
optimal resource allocation satisfies equations (58)-(59) in Proposition 7. 
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